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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HEBER W. GLENN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs 
RENA S. PLAYER, sometimes known as 
SERENA PLAYER, 
Defendant and Respondent: 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF PACTS 
Case No. 
8780 
This action was brought by the plaintiff and appellant 
against the defendant and respondent for specific perform-
ance of an agreement for the sale of real property dated 
February 11, 1932 (Tr. 21), Exhibit 3-P.) Said agree-
ment is designated as a Sales Contract and is executed 
by ·C. F. Player and Serena Player, his wife, as sellers and 
Heber W. Glenn as buyer. It describes certain real property 
situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, consisting of 
approximately 13 acres of land about a mile and a half 
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west of Redwood Road and about a mile south of 48th South 
St. (Tr. 17). The purchase price is at the rate of $200.00 
per acre and payable $il000.00 paid by the buyer at the 
time of the execution of the agreement, receipt of which is 
acknowledged and $600.00 on or before May 11, 1942 and 
the balance of the purchase price on or before Aug. 11, 1942. 
The agreement also contains the following agreement: "It 
is understood and agreed by both the sellers and the buyer 
that the buyer at his option, when he has paid ·$100.00 more 
than is sufficient to cover the full payment, at the rate of 
$200 per acre on either of the above tracts of land as de-
scribed, rna y enter onto said tract of land, fully paid for, 
and take possession and receive clear title thereto and such 
action shall not alter in any way the balance of the contract." 
(Exhibit 3-P.) 
That subsequent to the 11th day of February, 1942, 
the plaintiff entered into possession of the said real property 
and removed gravel therefrom. (Tr. 19, 35 and 36) 
That on May 10, 1942 the plaintiff offered to the 
sellers the balance of the purchase price and requested a deed 
and abstract of the property (Tr. 23, 29) and sellers failed 
to comply with said request. 
Subsequently on the 7th day of May, 1951 the said 
C. F. Player died and the defendant was appointed ex· 
ecutrix of the estate of C. F. Player (Tr. 48) and the real 
property described in said agreement was distributed to the 
defendant herein under the estate of C. F. Player deceased. 
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That at no time, either during the life of C. F. Player or 
since his death, was the plaintiff served with any kind of 
notice of cancellation of the contract. (Tr. 28, 55) 
That during the lifetime of the said C. F. Player the 
plaintiff made other visits to the Player home to settle the 
agreement and to obtain a deed to the premises. ( Tr. 30) 
That subsequently on Feb. 3rd, 1949 the plaintiff 
had the said agreement recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Utah in Book 660, 
page 123. (Tr. 31) 
That on March 29th, 1956 tender was made by the 
plaintiff through his attorneys to the defendant by regis-
tered mail of the balance of the purchase price and a request 
for a conveyance of said real property. (Tr. 32) 
That at no time has the defendant offered to refund the 
money paid on the agreement (Tr. 52) or give a deed on 
said real property (Tr. 53). 
That. the plaintiff did not file a claim in the estate of 
C. F. Player and proceeded with his action for specific 
performance of the agreement, after the distribution had been 
made to the defendant herein, against the defendant. 
The plaintiff now appeals from the decree of the trial 
court dismissing the plaintiff's complaint and declaring that 
the plaintiff has no right, title or interest in the real prop-
erty described in the agreement nor in the Sales agreement 
dated Feb. 11, 1942. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The Appellant and Plaintiff respectfully submits five 
points: 
POINT ONE 
Contract is entitled to be specifically enforced by the 
application of established principles or rules of equity 
designed for the administering of justice. 
POINT TWO 
Delay in pedormance of contract is not enough to de-
feat specific performance. 
POINT THREE 
Part performance entitled vendee to specific perform· 
ance of contract. 
POINT FOUR 
Optional part of agreement should he enforced as a 
matter of right. 
POINT FIVE 
Purchaser not required to file a claim against estate 
of C. F. Player. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
The appellant is entitled to a decree of specific per· 
formance of the agreement if the application of established 
principles or rules of equity designed for the administering 
of justice are applied. 
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49 Am. J ur. Specific Performance Sec. 9 (page 17) 
"As a general rule it may be said that when 
the party seeking specific performance of a contract 
establishes the existence of a valid binding contract 
which is definite and certain in its terms and contain 
the requisities of mutuality of obligation and is one 
which is free from unfairness, fraud or overreaching 
and enforceable without injustice upon the party 
against whom enforcement is sought, the court will, 
when the remedy at law for the breach of such con-
tract is inadequate and the enforcement of specific 
performance will not be inequitable, oppressive or 
unconscionable, or result in undue hardship, grant 
a decree of specific performance as a matter of 
course or right. 
Rights of the plaintiff to such relief where he 
makes a case coming within these equitable rules is 
not dependent upon any exercise or discretionary 
power on the part of the court in the literal sense of 
the term." 
Bennett vs. Moon, 110 Neb. 692, 194 N.W. 802, 
Let us look at the agreement in controversy described 
as "Sales Contract." It is entered into by and between C. F. 
Player and Serena Player, his wife as Sellers and Heber 
W. Glenn as Buyer; the said Serena Player being the de-
fendant and respondent in this action and the said Heber 
W. Glenn being the plaintiff and appellant. The real prop-
erty to be sold is adequately described. The acreage of 
approximately 13 acres is stated. The purchase price is at 
the rate of ·$200 per acre and payable $1000.00 in hand paid 
by the buyers, the receipt of which is acknowledged, $600.00 
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on or before May 11, 1942 and the balance of the purchase 
price on or before Aug. 11, 1942. In fact in excess of 
33 1/3% of the purchase price was paid at the time of 
the execution of the sales contract. 
The "Sales Contract" is a valid binding contract which 
is definite and certain in its terms and contains the requi-
sites of mutuality of obligation and there has been no 
evidence introduced which would infer that it was unfair or 
fraudulent, and certainly the buyer indicated his good faith 
in the purchase in paying a substantial part of the purchase 
price upon the execution of the contract. 
65 A.L.R. page 8, Specific Perfomance as Matter of Right 
''When a party to a contract appeals to a court of 
equity for a decree for specific performance, he ad-
dresses himself to what is termed the 'judicial discre-
tion' of the court. 
"The question whether a contract will be 
specifically enforced will he determined by the ap-
plication of established principles or rules of equity 
designed for the administering of justice and which 
are appropriate to the circumstances of the particular 
case. Primarily the contract sought to be enforced 
should be definite and legally binding upon the 
parties, and its enforcement should he practical and 
equitable." 
L'Engle vs. Overstreet 61 Fla. 653, 55 So. 381. 
"The jurisdiction of a court of equity in de-
creeing a specific performance of an agreement, is 
a peculiar jurisdiction in the exercise of which that 
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forum becomes of its own inherent strength, a court of 
. " conscience. 
Hudson vs. King. 2 Heisk. (Tenn.) 560. 
"It is said to be a discretionary jurisdiction, not 
indeed, or arbitrary or capricious discretion, depend-
ent upon the mere pleasure of the judge, but of that 
sound and reasonable discretion which governs itself, 
as far as it may, by general rules and principles but 
at the same time which withholds or grants relief 
according to the circumstances of each particular case, 
when these rules and principles will not furnish any 
exact measure· of justice between the parties." 
McNeil vs. McNeil, 61 Utah 141, 221 Pac. 988, which states: 
"The right to specific performance depends not 
upon hard and fast rules according to which all cases 
are to be decided, but each is dependent upon its 
own peculiar facts and circumstances." 
Halloran Judge Trust Co. vs. Heath, (Utah) 258 Pac. 342. 
65 A.L.R. page 14. Meaning of term "discretion" 
"Specific peformance of a contract to convey 
real estate will not be arbitrarily denied by the court, 
but only the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, 
in harmony with established principles and rules of 
equity." 
Griffin vs. Nash, 187 Iowa 345, 174 N.W. 233. 
Roberts vs. Braffett 33 Utah 51, 92 Pac. 789. 
65 A.L.R. page 39. 
"The inadequacy of the legal remedy to enforce 
a contract for the sale of land is assumed in every 
case where no objection is made thereto, and specific 
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performance of the contract follows as a matter of 
course." 
Cummings vs. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 619. 
"Warren vs. Goodloe, Ky. 20 S.W. 2nd 278 
holds that where a contract for the sale of land is 
fairly made, it is the duty of the court to enforce it. 
Where the contract sought to be enforced specifically 
concerns land the jurisdiction to enforce specific per-
formance is undisputed and does not depend upon 
the inadequacy o£ the legal remedy in the particular 
case." 
"Specific performance of a contract for the sale 
of land is a matter of right where it appears that the 
land sold for its actual value, that the sale was bona 
fide, that timely legal tender was made of the entire 
purchase price and performance was demanded." 
Beheret vs. Myers 240 Mo. 58, 144 S.W. 824. 
May we again call the court's attention to the fact that 
on May 10, 1942 the plaintiff offered to the sellers the 
balance of the purchase price and requested a deed and 
abstract of the property. (Tr. 23, 29) 
That during the lifetime of the said C. F. Player the 
plaintiff made other visits to the Player home to settle the 
agreement and to obtain a deed to the premises. (Tr. 30) 
That on Mar. 28, 1956 tender was again made and a 
request for conveyance. (Tr. 32) 
POINT TWO 
Delay in performance of contract is not enough to de· 
feat specific performance. 
49 Am. Jur. Sec. 73, page 89. Specific Performance. 
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"Although it is universally recognized that in-
excusable laches or default on the part of the party 
seeking such relief will be a sufficient ground for the 
denial of the relief, the vendor, to make the plain-
tiff's delay available as a defense, must have per-
formed or been ready and willing to perform all the 
terms of the contract stipulated for on his own part." 
Tate vs. Pensacola Gulf Land and Dev. Co. 37 Fla. 439, 
20, 542. 
Leaf vs. Codd, 41 Idaho 54 7, 240 Pac. 593. 
49 Am. J ur. Sec. 7 4, page 90. 
Delay alone is not enough. 
Wilson vs. Holub, 202 Iowa 549, 210 N.W. 593 
Delay caused by the acts of the defendant will not con-
stitute laches. 
Davis vs. Gray 16 Wall 203, 21 L ed 447, 
Hallin vs. Rogers 176 F 709, 34 Lra 120 
A plaintiff is not chargeable with laches until he has 
knowledge, that his rights under a contract are being disputed 
by the other party. 
De Cordova vs. Smith 9 Tex. 129, 55 Am. Dec. 136. 
49 Am. Jur. Sec. 75, page 92. Period Constituting Laches: 
"What length of time will constitute such laches 
as to bar recovery in a suit for specific performance 
depends upon many circumstances and rests largely 
in the sound discretion of the court. The lapse of time 
must be so great, and the relations of the defendant 
to the right such, that it would be inequitable to per-
mit the plaintiff to assert such right." 
Easkin vs. Wycoff, 118 Kan. 168, 234 P. 63 
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"What is a reasonable time within which to file 
a bill for specific performance cannot be fixed with 
precision by any general rule, but such delay as 
raises a presumption that the party has abandoned 
the contract is considered the equivalent to consent 
to its recission." 
De ·Huy vs~ Osborne 96 Fla. 435, 118 So. 161 
Chabot vs. Winter Park Co. 34 Fla. 258, 15 So. 756 
"Thus it follows that delay of a few months may 
constitute laches, and the decisions refusing specific 
performance include periods of from a few to many 
years and it has been granted following delays as 
long as 35 years." 
In Craig vs. Leiper 2 Yerg. (Term) 193, 24 Am. Dec. 
479, Where it appears that delay has been by the consent 
of both parties and occasioned by the vendor's failing to 
obtain the legal title, specific performance has been decreed 
.notwithstanding a lapse of thirty years from the making 
of ~the contract. 
49 Am. Jur. Sec. 76, page 93. "In order for 
delay in seeking specific performance to constitute 
laches it must have been prejudicial to the defend-
ant." 
Oliver vs. Poulos 312 Mass. 188, 44 N.E. 2nd l, 
65 A.L.R. 55. "But mere delay in performance of a con-
tract will not ordinarily preclude a decree for its 
specific performance, where acquiesced in by the 
other party." 
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Many cases cited. 
Laches due to the act of the defendant will not preclude 
specific performance in behalf of the plaintiff. 
Zempel vs. Hughes 235 Ill. 424, 85 N.E. 641. 
"If the delay upon the part of the vendee is 
attributable to the conduct of the vendor, it will not 
stand in the way of a decree for specific performance 
of the contract in'· behalf of the vendee." 
Howard vs. Moore 4 Sneed (Tenn) 317. 
"Delay by the vendee in paying the purchase 
price, where the vendor takes no steps to forfeit the 
vendee's rights under an executory contract for the 
purchase of land, will not preclude relief in behaH 
of the vendee who has paid a large share of the pur-
h . '' c ase price. 
Lewis vs. Wellard, 62 Wash 590, 114 Pac. 455. 
81 C.J. Sec. page 639, Specific Performance 
"Where time for performance is not essential 
the mere lapse of time does not necesarily bar plain-
tiff from relief. No rule with respect to the length 
of the delay which will be fatal to relief can be laid 
down, but each case must depend on its peculiar 
circumstances. A delay will not deprive plaintiff 
of relief if he has never abandoned the contract and 
the defendant has suffered nothing from the delay 
for which he cannot be compensated in te decree." 
Yates vs. American Republics Corp. 163 F2nd 178 
Garbis vs. Weistock 51 A 2nd 154, 187 Md. 549. 
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4. Now, let us apply the foregoing to the facts in the present 
case. 
,The plaintiff offered to the sellers the balance of the 
purchase price on May 10, 1942 (Tr. 23, 29) and made 
other attempts to obtain the deed ( Tr. 30) and the defend-
ant as one of the sellers was not ready or willing to perform 
her· part of the contract. 
The plaintiff is not chargeable with laches until he has 
know ledge that his rights are being disputed by the other 
party. At no time, during the life of C. F. Player or since 
his death, was the plaintiff served with any kind of notice 
of cancellation of the contract. Tr. 28, 55) 
At no time could it be presumed that plaintiff had 
abandoned the contract, in view of his substantial down pay-
ment, (See exhibit 3 P ) , the fact that he recorded the contract 
on Feb. 3, 1949 (Tr. 31) and also made tender of payment 
to the defendant (Tr. 32) 
Certainly the delay has been by the consent of both 
parties and would have been paid on May 10, 1942 if the 
vendors had delivered title. 
The Roberts vs. Braffett case, 33 Utah 51. 
A contract for the sale of real estate entered into in 
March 1902 called for performance the following October 
by the payment of the price and the execution of the deed. 
The purchaser paid a part of the price, hut failed to pay the 
balance due in October. The vendor frequently thereafter 
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demanded payment and notified the purchaser to pay or the 
contract would be rescinded. The plaintiff claimed that 
notwithstanding his delay and neglect, he is entitled to have 
the contract specifically enforced because the defendant made 
no tender of a deed and therefore did not put the plaintiff 
in legal default. 
The case of Roberts vs. Braffett is an analysis of the 
law which particularly affects many aspects of the present 
case. May we call the Court's attention to the fact that in the 
Sales Contract there is no reference to time being the es-
sence of the contract. (See Exhibit) 
Justice Straup in his opinion makes this statement: 
"It may be conceded that the stipulations and 
provisions contained in the contract were mutual, 
concurrent and dependent. It may also be conceded 
that time was not of the essence of the contract as orig-
inally made." He then refers to Pomeroy on Spe-
cific Performance of Contract, Section 395 ( 2d Ed.) 
"As the doctrine that time is not essential in the 
performance of the contract may sometime work in-
justice, and be used as the excuse for unwarrantabl~ 
laches, the following rule was introduced at a com-
paratively late period and is now firmly settled, 
which prevents the doctrine from being abused by 
the neglect or willfulness of either party. If either 
the vendor or the vendee has improperly and unrea-
sonably delayed in complying with the terms of the 
agreement on his side, the other party may, by notice, 
fix upon and assign a reasonable time for complet-
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ing the contract, and may call upon the defaulting 
party to do the acts to be done by him, or any par-
ticular act within this period. The time thus allotted 
then becomes essential and if the party in default fails 
to perform before it has elapsed, the court will not 
aid him in enforcing the contract, but will leave him 
to his legal remedy." 
At Section 396 Pomeroy says: "That the notice 
cannot be arbitrary and a sudden termination of the 
contract; it must allow a reasonable length of time 
for the other party to perform and if it fails in any 
of these respects it may be disregarded and will 
produce no effect upon the equitable remedial rights 
of party to whom it is given; and that to be effectual 
in making the time allotted an essential element of the 
performance the notice must be express, clear, dis-
tinct, and unequivocal." 
The defendant admits in her testimony that no notice 
of cancellation was ever given. (Tr. 28, 56) 
At Sections 361 and 362 Pomeroy points out the dis-
tinction between granting specific performance of contracts 
when time is and when not, made essential. He says: 
"Where the stipulations are mutual and depend-
ant-that is, where the deed is to be delivered upon 
the payment of the price, either on a day named or 
without any day being specified, an actuai tender and 
demand by one party is absolutely necessary to put 
the other in default and to cut off his right to treat 
the agreement as still subsisting. So long as neither 
party makes such tender-of the deed by the vendor 
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and of the price or securities by the vendee-neither 
party is in default; the contract remains in force and 
either party rna y make a proper tender or offer 
I " ant sue. 
POINT THREE 
Part performance entitled vendee to specific perform-
ance of contract. 
65 A.L.R. page 63. "An exception to the rule 
that a court will not enforce an inequitable contract 
is that where the defendant has received the considera-
tion and retains it and alleges as a ground for not 
being required to perform that performance would be 
inequitable under the circumstances the court will 
decree performance without inquiry into the ques-
tion." 
Indianapolis Northern Traction Co. vs. Essington 54 
Ind. App. 286 99 N.E. 757, 100 N.E. 765. 
"Where it is shown that there has been part per-
formance of the contract under circumstances which 
affect the conscience of the defendant and his failure 
to carry out the contract would operate as a fraud 
upon the plaintiff's right, a decree of specific per-
formance will be granted as a matter of right." 
Tidewater R. Co. vs. Hurt 109 V a. 204, 63 S.E. 421 
West vs. Bundy 78 Mo. 407 
Dougherty vs. Harsel, 91 Mo. 161, 3 S. W. 583 
Anderson vs. Scott 94 Mo. 637, 8 S. W. 235 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
49 Am. Jur. Sec. 76, page 94 
"The purchaser in a contract for the sale of land 
has been held not to be precluded, however, from 
maintaining a suit for its specific performance he-
cause the land has increased in value, where such 
increase has taken place after he has paid a part of 
the purchase price and the delay in offering to pay 
the balance is neither unreasonable nor due to had 
faith." 
Harris vs. Greenleaf, 117 Ky. 817, 79 S.W. 268, 4 Ann. 
case. 849 
In the case before the Court, it will be remembered that 
the buyer had paid as a down payment in excess of one-third 
of the purchase price. The defendant admits that the pay-
ment was received and that she has retained it. (Tr. 52) 
In Roberts vs. Braffett 33 Utah page 91 Chief Justice 
McCarty in his dissenting opinion makes the following state-
ment and reference; which is significant to this portion of 
this case: 
"It is a well established doctrine that before a 
party will be permitted to rescind his contract he 
must account or offer to account to the other party for 
the money, if any, paid in part performance of the 
contract. In the case of Frnik vs. Thompson this 
same principle of law was involved and in the course 
of the opinion the court says: 
"There is yet another reason why plaintiff can-
not have this contract rescinded. It appears from 
the complaint that soon a~ter making the contract 
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defendant paid $340 of the purchase price. Before 
plaintiff can abandon the contract and treat it as at 
an end, he must refund or offer to refund the money 
paid in performance of it, with legal accrued inter-
est. It is a general rule that in order to disaffirm 
a contract and entitled a party to the right resulting 
therefrom, the rescinding party must put the other 
in statu quo. It would certainly be unjust to permit 
plaintiff, after having received a part of the purchase 
money, to put an end to the contract, upon the failure 
of defendant to pay the remainder, without offering 
to account to him for the money already paid. He 
who seeks the aid of a court of equity must himself 
do equity." 
This statement of rule was quoted and approved by this 
court in the case of Brixen vs. Jorgensen, 28 Utah 290, 78 
Pac. 674. 
In Johnson vs. Jackson, 27 Miss. 498, 61 Am. Dec. 522, 
it is said: 
"The vendors could not abandon the contract and 
treat it as at an end, without refunding to the vendee 
the money he had paid in part pefromance of it. For 
it is a general rule that, in order to disaffirm a con-
tract and entitle the parties to the rights resulting 
therefrom, both parties must be placed in statu quo. 
It would certainly be unjust to permit the vendors 
after having received part of the purchase money 
from the vendee at the time of the contract, to put 
an end to the contract upon the failure to pay the 
residue of the purchase money and to make a resale 
to a third person, without refunding the money paid." 
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POINT FOUR 
The Sales Contract reads as follows: 
"It· is ~nderstood · and agreed by both the sellers 
and the buyer that the buyer at his option, when he 
has paid One hundred ($100.) dollars more than is 
sufficient to cover the full payment, at the rate of 
$200. per acre on either of the above tracts of land 
as described, rna y enter onto said tract of land, fully 
paid for, and take possession and receive clear title 
thereto and such action shall not alter in any way the 
balance of this contract" (See Exhibit) 
Another paragraph of Sales Contract reads as follows: 
"In the event that the buyer shall fail to pay the 
balance of the purchase price as herein provided, the 
amount paid, over and above that necessary under the 
provision stated above, to clear title to any of the 
separate tracts described above, shall, at the option 
of the sellers, he retained as liquidated and agreed 
damages." (See Exhibit) 
The defendant in her own evidence admits that she re-
ceived $1100.00 from the plaintiff and that she has never 
returned said sum. ( Tr. 52) 
By the terms of the contract, therefore, the plaintiff 
has :paid for 5 acres of the land, may enter onto said tract, 
fully paid for and is entitled to receive clear title thereto. 
POINT FIVE 
The purchaser not required to file a claim against 
estate of C. F. Player. 
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The Sales Contract is entered into by and between 
C. F. Player and Serena Player, his wife, as Sellers and 
Heber W. Glenn as Buyer, and the said Serena Player who 
is the defendant and respondent herein signed the said con-
tract. (See Exhibit ( Tr. 45, 46) 
The said defendant and respondent is therefore a pri-
mary party to the Sales Contract and there is no reason why a 
claim should have been filed against the estate of her de-
ceased husband, C. F. Player. 
49 Am. Jur. Sec. 147. Specific Performance: 
Specific performance of a contract may be decreed not 
only between the parties, but between all those claiming under 
them in privity of estate or representation or title. 
Contracts for the conveyance of land are capable of 
specific performance not only against the parties and their 
voluntary grantees and vendees with notice, but as against 
their heirs. devisees and widows. 
Jennison vs. Leonard 21 Wall, 302, 
Offutt vs. Offutt, 106 Md. 236, 67 A. 138 
Middletown vs. Newport Hospital 16 RI 319, 15 A. 
800 
Robinson vs. McDonald 11 Tex, 385, 62 Am. Dec. 480. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons herein stated, the Decree of the Dis-
trict Court should be reversed and the appellant prevail. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Backman, Backman and Clark, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
